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11. Introduction
This paper addresses the general question of whether economic integration
can be expected to increase the differences in industrial structure between
more and less developed regions. In particular, its aim is to gain insight on
how trade liberalisation and factor mobility can be expected to affect the
relative importance of history and expectations in determining the
international distribution of economic activities.
The point of view is the so-called «new economic geography» (Krugman
(1991a)) that explains the spatial distribution of economic activities as the
result of «macroeconomic complementarities» due to the interaction
between competition and market size effects. On the one side, competition
for local factors and consumers discourages the concentration of many
firms in a single region. On the other, in the presence of increasing returns
and trade costs, the concentration of consumers and firms in a single
location generates pecuniary externalities that favour agglomeration.
The crucial role of the level of trade costs for the balance between
competition and market size effects has been stressed at length in static
models where it is shown that lower trade costs encourage agglomeration
by weakening the competition effect more than the market size effect.
However, the importance of trade costs for the dynamic properties of the
economy has been so far left unexplored due to the high non-linearity
induced by pecuniary externalities. Thus, all existing models either confine
themselves to ad hoc dynamic arguments that are not consistent with
rational expectations and forward looking optimising behaviour (e.g.
Krugman (1992), Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1998)) or give up
pecuniary externalities in favour of more manageable technological
spillovers (e.g. Matsuyama (1991), Krugman (1991b)). The problem with
the first solution is logical coherence; the problem with the second is that
the microeconomic origin of macroeconomic externalities is left
unexplained.
This paper illustrates how both problems can be tackled in a parsimonious
2model based on Krugman (1991a). As in Krugman’s model, agglomeration
arises from labour migration in the presence of pecuniary externalities.
However, differently from Krugman’s model, migration is costly and
agents take forward-looking decisions.
The paper studies the dynamic adjustment triggered by the liberalisation
of labour movements between two regions with initially different sizes. It
asks under what circumstances expectations can reverse the lock-in effect
of the historically inherited size advantage of the bigger region. It shows
that this can happen only if the initial advantage of the leading region is
not too big and if the trade and/or migration costs are low enough.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model. Section 3 solves the model. Section 4 deals with the relative
importance of history and expectations. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
Non-linearity is the barrier that discourages full-fledged dynamic analysis
in location models with pecuniary externalities à la Krugman. However, on
the one side, as argued by Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1998), non-
linearity has little bearing on their fundamental insights. On the other side,
as shown by Krugman (1991b), subtle dynamic issues, such as the relative
importance of history and expectations, can be satisfactorily studied in
linear models. This section presents a «linear» location model à la Krugman
that allows full-fledged dynamic analysis at the cost of two main
simplifying assumptions on, respectively, preferences and factor mobility.
Both assumptions will be discussed in due course.
The economic framework is the monopolistic competition model of Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977). The economy consists of two regions, A and B. There is
only one input, labour, whose total endowment in the economy is set to
one by choice of units so that LÎ[0,1] workers are in A and (1-L) workers
are in B.
Workers are infinitely lived with rate of time preference rÎ(0,+¥).
However, following Matsuyama (1991), Krugman (1991b), and Galì (1995),
consumption smoothing is inhibited by ruling out any form of
3intertemporal trade.  Consequently, at any point in time, expenditures
equal income. For notational convenience, the dependence of variables
upon time will be omitted when it does not generate confusion.
There are two consumption goods: a homogeneous good M and a
horizontally differentiated good C which is appreciated also for its variety
(S-D-S «love for variety» (Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)). Each
agent in location i (i=A,B) has instantaneous utility:
U B C Mi i i=
- -( ) /m m q1 1 1          (1)
where BÎ(0,+¥) is an arbitrary constant, mÎ[0,1] is the differentiated good
share of expenditures, qÎ(1,+¥) is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, Mi is the consumption of the homogeneous good, Ci is the
C.E.S. quantity index:
[ ]C nc n ci i ii j ji= +- - -( )/ ( )/ /( )s s s s s s1 1 1            (2)
where cji is the amount of a typical variety produced in j and consumed in
i, sÎ(1,+¥) is the elasticity of substitution between varieties and also the
elasticity of demand for each variety. Symmetry among varieties produced
at the same location has been considered.
Let us introduce the first of the two simplifying assumptions that will
allow closed-form dynamic analysis. It is a restriction on parameters. Due
to the absence of intertemporal trade the exact value of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is immaterial thus adding a degree of freedom
in the choice of parameter values. This additional degree of freedom is
exploited in order to make the model solvable. Assume therefore
qºm/(1+m-s) which yields a well-defined consumer’s problem as long as
1+m>s. As we will see, this restriction will make instantaneous indirect
utility flows linear functions of L and will thus allow the evolution of the
economy to be described by a system of linear differential equations.
In addition to their consumption, workers also choose in which region to
live and whether to be employed in the homogeneous or in the
differentiated good sectors. It is assumed that workers are perfectly mobile
between sectors in the same region. However, only workers employed in
4the differentiated good sector can migrate. In different words, there is no
rural-urban inter-regional mobility. This is the second main simplifying
assumption that will allow for an analytical characterization of the
dynamics. Apart from its technical convenience, this assumption has some
tradition in the literature. In many recent developments it is customary to
think of the differentiated good sector as being skill-intensive, at least
when compared to the homogeneous good sector («labour dualism»).
Thus, the assumption on interregional migration captures, in an extreme
fashion, the fact that skilled workers are more mobile than unskilled ones
(see, e.g., Smith and Zenou (1997) for a recent assessment on «dual labour
markets»). This extreme assumption is not unusual in the so-called «new
economic geography». For example, the same extreme assumption is
adopted by Krugman (1991a). However, while Krugman assumes an
exogenous distribution between the two types of workers, here the
distribution is endogenously determined.
As in Krugman (1991a), the fact that a fraction of the population is
immobile builds a centrifugal force into the model: in the presence of trade
costs, firms have an incentive to locate close to the immobile population.
However, in the present setting, it will be shown that this force is  too weak
to prevent agglomeration.
When moving between regions, migrants incur a cost which depends on
the rate of migration, dL/dt= &L  (Mussa (1978)). More precisely, a migrant
incurs a marginal utility loss equal to L& /g with gÎ(0,+¥). In other words,
each migrant imposes a negative externality on other migrants: the larger
the number of migrants, the larger the cost of migration. This assumption
may be seen as capturing in a simple way the hardships that people face in
reality when taking part in large migration flows.
Consider now the production side of the economy. The differentiated good
is produced in a monopolistically competitive increasing-return sector. The
related cost function is:
wi li = wi (a + bxi )     a,b>0,  i=A,B          (3)
5where li is the amount of labour required to produce the typical variety, wi
is the wage rate and xi is the output of the typical variety, xii of which is
produced for the home market and xij for the foreign one (xi=xii+xij). While
it is freely traded within regions, the differentiated good can be exchanged
between regions only at a cost. Trade costs are modelled as Samuelson’s
(1952) «iceberg costs»: in order to deliver one unit of any variety from
location j to location i (j¹i), t units must be shipped, with tÎ[1,+¥).
The homogeneous good is produced in a perfectly competitive constant-
return sector and it is freely traded. It is chosen as the numeraire and its
unit input coefficient is set to one by choice of units. It is assumed that in
equilibrium the homogenous good is produced in both regions. As it can
be easily verified, this is the case if m<1/2. Due to the presence of
increasing returns in the differentiated good sector, the region with a
smaller share of workers eventually specialises in the production of the
homogenous good. However, if the expenditures share of this latter good
(1-m) is larger than 1/2, the smaller region is not able to supply the whole
demand.  Together with the assumption of free intra-regional inter-sectoral
labour mobility, this ensures factor price equalization, i.e. wA=wB=1.
3. The spatial evolution of the economy
Without intertemporal trade, a worker faces a static consumption decision
and a dynamic migration decision. Considering the former, the solution of
the model is standard (e.g., Krugman (1993)). The total number of firms in
the economy is constant, (nA+nB)=m/(as). The pattern of production is:
 n L when L=
+
-
-
- +
< <
+
1
1 1 1
1
1
f
f
f
f
f
f f
        (4a)
n when L LL= £ +
º0
1
f
f
         (4b)
n when L LH= ³ +
º1
1
1 f
         (4c)
where nÎ[0,1] is the share of the total number of firms that are  located  in
A  and f Î(0,1] is the ratio of total demand by domestic residents for each
foreign variety to demand for each domestic variety:
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Equations (4) show that, whenever L lies inside the range [LL,LH],
agglomeration of the differentiated good sector is incomplete but the
region with more workers produces a more than proportionate number of
varieties. This is often called the «market size effect» (Helpman and
Krugman (1985)).
The static consumption decision yields the following instantaneous flows
of indirect utility for typical workers in the two regions:
)1( nnU A -+= f         (6a)
)1( nnU A -+= f        (6b)
where, without loss of generality, utilities have been scaled by the
adequate choice of the arbitrary constant B.
By equations (4) the instantaneous flow indirect utility differential is then:
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Since the indirect utility is higher where there are more workers, the model
always exhibits agglomeration economies. Given the definition of f, those
economies are stronger the lower the trade cost t and the elasticity s,
which can be interpreted as an inverse index of returns of scale in
equilibrium (e.g. Krugman (1991a)). This interpretation of the parameter s
is worth discussing. s  is both the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of
substitution. It is therefore a preference parameter. However, in
equilibrium it turns out to be a direct measure of the price distortion and
an inverse measure of the quantity distortion due to monopoly power. For
this reason, Krugman (1991a) likes to interpret s as an inverse measure of
returns to scale that remain unexploited in equilibrium due to monopoly
power. Even though such interpretation may seem unpalatable, it is kept in
7the present paper to ease the comparison with Krugman’s work.
Consider now the intertemporal migration decision. By assumption only
workers employed in the monopolistically competitive sector can migrate.
This implies that the economy will never move away from the incomplete
specialization range [LL,LH].
The migration decision is based on a «shadow price» defined as follows.
Let vA(t) and vB(t) be the expected discounted sums of future utility minus
moving costs of an agent currently in A and in B respectively. Let T be the
first time the economy hits the boundaries L=LL or L=LH, then by
definition:
 A
t
T
A
- s-t
A
- T-tv t  =  U s  e ds + v T  e( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ò r r         (8a)
B
t
T
B
- s-t
B
- T-tv t  =  U s  e ds + v T  e( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ò r r        (8b)
Moreover, since agents in each location have the option to move to the
other location by paying the marginal relocation  cost, ½ &L ½/g,
A Bv t   v t  -  
|L t |
     with equality if   L t <0( ) ( )
&( ) &( )³
g
        (9a)
B Av t   v t  -  
|L t |
     with equality if   L t >0( ) ( )
&( ) &( )³
g
       (9b)
The shadow price is then defined as:
v t v t v tA B( ) ( ) ( )º -        (10)
This shadow price represents the difference in «private» value between
being in region A rather than in region B.
Equations (9) and (8) can be used to derive the economy laws of motion.
They imply respectively:
&L(t) =  v(t)g      (11a)
 v(t) = v(t) -  U (t)-U (t) v(t) - L tA B& [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )r r s s= + + +2 1 1      (11b)
Equations (11) have intuitive appeal. Equation (11a) states that the private
marginal benefit of migration equals its private marginal cost. Equation
(11b) states that the «annuity value» of being in A rather than in B, rv(t),
equals the «dividend», [UA(t)-UB(t)], plus the «capital gain», &( )v t .
8Finally, the terminal conditions can be determined following Fukao and
Benabou (1993, Proposition 2). They are either (LL,0) or (LH,0). A zero value
of v(T) is required because the system hits a boundary, L=LL or L=LH, in
finite time T.
4. History versus expectations
Two roots correspond to system (11) and are defined by:
l
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If r2>8(1+f)g there are two real positive roots, the system is unstable and it
steadily diverges from (0.5,0). On the contrary, if r2<8(1+f)g the two roots
are complex with positive real part, the system is still unstable, but it
diverges from the centre in expanding oscillations (Figure 1). This entails
that, while in the first case for any initial value of L in (LL,LH) there is only
one optimal path and it leads to the closer endpoint, in the second case
there is a subset of initial values of L, that support two optimal paths going
in opposite directions. In the first case, history alone determines the long-
run equilibrium. If L<0.5 [L>0.5] the economy will eventually reach (LL,0)
[(LH,0)]. If L=0.5 the economy will stay there forever. The situation is
different in the second case. If the economy starts anywhere between LLP
and LHP (the «overlap» (Krugman (1991b)), both (LL,0) and (LH,0) are
possible outcomes of self-fulfilling expectations. For any initial value of L
in the overlap there are two optimal spiral paths: one leading to (LL,0), the
other to (LH,0). Expectations decide along which spiral path the economy is
going to move: the expected path will turn out to be the true path («self-
fulfilling prophecy»). Outside the overlap history alone matters. So,
historically inherited spatial distributions of economic activity can be
changed by expectations only if L belongs to the overlap.
The width of the overlap can be found following Fukao and Benabou
(1993). Starting from (LF,0) and (LH,0), the system is solved backwards in
time. Let {L(t),v(t)} be the trajectory that solves (11) with initial condition
(LF,0). Call t* the first time v(t)=0 along the trajectory, then LHP=L(t*). The
same procedure with initial condition (LH,0) can be used to determine LLP.
9To assess the relative importance of expectations with respect to history,
what matters is the relative width of the overlap [LLP, LHP] with respect to
the range [LL,LH]. The expression of the relative width of the overlap, say L,
is:
( )[ ] eL = - + -
-
rp f g r8 1 2
1 2/
       (13)
Thus, four parameters affect the existence and the relative width of the
overlap: the rate of time preference r, the inverse index of migration costs
g, the transport cost parameter t and the elasticity of substitution s. More
precisely, the overlap exists if the rate of time preference, migration costs,
trade costs and the elasticity of substitution are low. Moreover its relative
width L is decreasing in r, in t and in s, while it is increasing in the speed
of adjustment (i.e. increasing in g). The intuition behind these results is the
following. If the future is heavily discounted, workers do not care much
about other workers’ future decisions, so that the possibility of self-
fulfilling prophecies is reduced. If the adjustment is slow, the indirect
utility differential will remain close to its current level for a long time
whatever the expectations, so that households’ migration always follows
current differentials. Finally, large transport costs t and weak returns to
scale (large s) reduce the incentive towards the agglomeration of economic
activities: there is weak interdependence among workers’ location
decisions, workers do not care much about other workers’ future decisions,
so that there is little ground for self-fulfilling expectations.
These results can be used to assess the impact of economic integration on
the spatial evolution of the economy. Consider an initial situation in which
the two regions have different size and trade as well as migration costs are
prohibitive. Will integration foster agglomeration in the initially larger
region? Ceteris paribus, it will depend on the extent of integration. If the
reduction in trade and migration costs is small (i.e., such that r2>8(1+f)g),
then economic integration will only lock in the initial advantage of the
larger region. However, if the fall in trade and migration costs is large
enough (i.e., such that r2<8(1+f)g) and the two regions are not too different
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(i.e., such that LÎ[LLP, LHP]), then there is room for self-fulfilling
expectations to reverse the historical lead of the larger region.
5. Conclusion
Economic integration removes the obstacles to trade and factor mobility. In
the presence of increasing returns in production, it reinforces
agglomeration economies arising from agents’ converging location
decisions. Starting from an initial situation in which there is no trade and
no labour mobility, a large enough reduction in trade and migration costs
creates room for coordinated migration, led by converging expectations
about the future evolution of the economy, to challenge the lock-in effect of
the historically inherited spatial pattern of economic activity. The more so
the stronger the returns to scale and the more patient agents are.
These results have been derived in a parsimonious general equilibrium
model of location à la Krugman with forward-looking migration decisions.
Analytical solutions have been obtained due to two main simplifying
assumptions on preferences and labour mobility. While these assumptions
are admittedly restrictive they show that proper and fruitful dynamic
analysis is not completely out of reach as previously argued in the
literature.
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APPENDIX: Equilibrium paths and the width of the overlap
This appendix derives the width of the overlap following Fukao and Benabou (1993). If T=0 is the
time when the economy reaches either (LL,0) or (LH,0), explicit solutions can be derived from
system (11) by working backwards in time. In the complex roots case (i.e. r2<8(1+f)g), using
(LL,0) as initial conditions, the solutions are:
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From (A.2) v(t)=0 for the first time at t=-p[2(1+f)g-(r2/4)](-1/2). Substituting this value for t into
(A.1) gives a value for L which is the right bound of the overlap, LHP:
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On the other hand, using (LH,0) as initial conditions, the solutions are:
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Then from (A.5) v(t)=0 for the first time at  t=-p[2(1+f)g-(r2/4)] (-1/2) as before, while by (A.4) the
left bound of the overlap, LLP, is:
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Finally, by (A.3), (A.6) and the definition of LL and LH, the width of the overlap, say P=LHP-LLP,
is:
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and the overlap is centered around L=0.5.
So, the the relative width of the overlap with respect to [LL,LH], labelled L, is simply P/(LH-LL) that
is:
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This is equation (13) in the paper.
Figure 1 - The “overlap” [LLP,LHP]
